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Abstract
We say that a real X is n-generic relative to a perfect tree T if X is
a path through T and for all Σ0n(T ) sets S, there exists a number k such
that either X|k ∈ S or for all σ ∈ T extending X|k we have σ /∈ S. A
real X is n-generic relative to some perfect tree if there exists such a T .
We first show that for every number n all but countably many reals are
n-generic relative to some perfect tree. Second, we show that proving this
statement requires ZFC− + “∃ infinitely many iterates of the power set
of ω”. Third, we prove that every finite iterate of the hyperjump, O(n),
is not 2-generic relative to any perfect tree and for every ordinal α below
the least λ such that supβ<λ(βth admissible) = λ, the iterated hyperjump
O(α) is not 5-generic relative to any perfect tree. Finally, we demonstrate
some necessary conditions for reals to be 1-generic relative to some perfect
tree.
1 Introduction
A real (viewed as an element of 2ω) is n-generic if for every Σ0n set there is an
initial segment of the real which either meets the set or for which no extension of
the segment can meet the set. These reals have many interesting characteristics
and have been studied extensively (see Jockusch and Posner [3] and Kumabe
[5] among others). While the set of n-generics is comeager, it is in some ways
limited. In particular, it is completely excluded from the cone above 0′ since no
1-generic can compute an r.e. set.
A question which naturally arises then is how this set might be expanded
from reals which are n-generic to those that can be made to seem n-generic
in some appropriate context. An attractive framework for this question is to
consider reals which are n-generic when viewed as paths through a given perfect
tree, rather than all of 2ω.
Definition: A real X is n-generic relative to a perfect tree T if X is a path
through T and for all Σ0n(T ) sets S, there is a k such that either X |k ∈ S or
σ /∈ S for every σ ∈ T extending X |k.
1
Definition: A real X is n-generic relative to some perfect tree if there exists a
perfect tree T such that X is n-generic relative to T .
This definition results in a version of genericity which includes many reals
which seem “essentially” generic. For example, if G is a n-generic real and R
is recursive then neither G ⊕R nor G ⊕G is n-generic, but both are n-generic
relative to some perfect tree. Another form of relative genericity that has been
studied is genericity relative to another real. Given a real A we say that a real X
is n-generic(A) if for every Σ0n(A) set S, either X meets S or there is an initial
segment of X which has no extensions in S. This results in a more restrictive
version of genericity which is similar to higher levels of genericity. For example
a real is 1-generic(0′) if and only if it is 2-generic. We note that every real which
is n-generic(A) for some real A is n-generic and every real which is n-generic is
n-generic relative to some perfect tree.
In this paper, we examine the set of reals n-generic relative to some perfect
tree. We first show that the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect
tree is countable. From this we can infer that many reals with properties that
are not normally associated with genericity still seem generic in the context of
some perfect tree. For example, there are reals of minimal degree and reals with
high information content, such as the theory of second order arithmetic, that
are generic relative to some perfect tree.
The proof that the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree
is countable uses ZFC− and n iterates of the power set of ω. We show that
for sufficiently large n, this requirement is sharp and cannot be significantly
improved. From this we see that for reasonably high values of n, the set of reals
not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is unusually large (rich) for a countable
set of this type. It provides a natural example of a set which needs this level of
ZFC to be understood.
While the result above holds only for sufficiently high values of n, for lower
values the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is also rich.
By looking at the iterates of the hyperjump, we demonstrate that the set still
contains reals of unexpectedly high complexity. Even for n = 2, relatively large
fragments of arithmetic fail to prove the set is countable. We also begin to
characterize the sets that are 1-generic relative to some perfect tree.
These results are in a similar vein to results of Reimann and Slaman [9],
who have studied the set of reals which appear random in some context, in
this case relative to some continuous measure. Our results for genericity are
analogous to what they discovered for randomness in surprisingly many, but
not all, instances.
This work formed part of the author’s Ph.D. Thesis at the University of
California at Berkeley. We thank Theodore Slaman, the dissertation supervisor,
for his introduction to the topic and his repeated suggestions of new approaches
to problems.
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2 Co-Countably Many Reals
We wish to show that the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree
is countable. D. Martin [7] used Borel determinacy to show that any property
which is Borel and cofinal in the Turing degrees is represented on every degree
in a cone of Turing degrees. The base of this cone is the complexity of the
winning strategy for an associated game.
Theorem 2.1 (Martin [7]). Let B be a Borel set of reals such that for every
Turing degree d there is an e ≥T d and an X in e such that X ∈ B. Then there
is a degree c such that for all b ≥T c there is a Y in b such that Y ∈ B.
Proof. Consider a two person game where player I constructs a real X and
player II constructs a real Y . Play alternates between the players, each adding
the next digit to the real they are constructing for their turn. Player I wins iff
Y ≤T X and either X 6≤T Y or X ∈ B.
By Borel determinacy, there exists a winning strategy σ. Suppose σ is a
winning strategy for II. Since B is cofinal in the Turing degrees, let Z ∈ B with
σ ≤T Z. Let I play Z and II play according to σ resulting in Y . But then since
σ ≤T Z, we have Y ≤T Z with Z ∈ B so I wins for a contradiction. Hence σ
must be a winning strategy for I.
Let Z ≥T σ be an arbitrary real in the cone above σ. Have II play Z and
I play according to σ, resulting in X . Since σ ≤T Z we have X ≤T Z. Since I
wins, Z ≤T X and X ∈ B. Hence for any Z in the cone, there is an X ∈ B such
that X ≡T Z.
Reimann and Slaman [9] have developed a powerful way to relativize this
lemma. Let B ⊆ 2ω × 2ω denote a set of reals where the first real holds some
property relative to the second. Let BZ = {X | (X,Z) ∈ B} and let the notation
X ≡T,A Y mean X⊕A ≡T Y ⊕A. Suppose that for every Z the set BZ is Borel
in Z and cofinal in the Turing degrees as in the above method for generating
a cone. They prove that for all but countably many reals X , there exist reals
Y and G such that X ≡T,G Y and Y ∈ BG. We outline this proof in the next
paragraph.
Let β be the least ordinal such that Lβ satisfies enough ZFC (Lβ is countable)
and let X /∈ Lβ be arbitrary. Reimann and Slaman use Kumabe-Slaman forcing
to find a real G such that Lβ[G] |= ZFC and every element of 2
ω ∩ Lβ[G] is
recursive in X ⊕ G. In particular, the strategy for the game in the proof of
Theorem 2.1 relative to G is recursive in X ⊕G. So by Theorem 2.1 relativized
to G there exists Y ∈ BG with Y ≡T,G X .
Thus to prove all but countably many reals are n-generic relative to some
perfect tree, we need to find a set B such that for any X,Y,G with Y ≡T,G X
and Y ∈ BG we have X n-generic relative to some perfect tree. B must also be
Borel and such that for every Z the set BZ is cofinal in the Turing degrees. We
find it suffices to let B be the set of reals of Turing degree X ⊕A for any X,A
such that X is (n+ 1)-generic(A). We use the following lemma.
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Lemma 2.2. Let n ≥ 2, A be a set, X be n-generic(A), and X ≡T,A Y . Then
Y is (n− 1)-generic relative to some perfect tree.
Proof. Let Ψ : X → Y and Φ : Y → X be A-recursive Turing reductions that
witness X ≡T,A Y . Since X is at least 2-generic(A), let p ∈ X be such that
p  Φ ◦ Ψ = id ∧ Ψ total (i.e. this statement holds for all 2-generic(A) reals
extending p). Let T = {σ | ∃q ⊇ p[σ ⊆ Ψ(q)]}. T is a perfect tree by our choice
of p. We claim that Y is (n− 1)-generic relative to T .
Let S be an arbitrary Σ0n−1(T ) set. We consider the pullback Ψ
−1(S) =
{x | ∃y[Ψ(x) ⊇ y ∧ y ∈ S]}. T is Σ01(A) so S is Σ
0
n(A) and Ψ
−1(S) is Σ0n(A).
We will now apply the genericity of X for the pullback to get the genericity of
Y for S.
Since X is n-generic (A) we have two possible cases.
Case 1: ∃n[X |n ∈ Ψ−1(S)]. We then let m be such that Y |m ⊆ Ψ(X |n) and
Y |m ∈ S.
Case 2: ∃n∀q ⊇ X |n[q /∈ Ψ−1(S)]. Let m be such that Φ(Y |m) ⊇ X |n. We
will show Y |m witnesses Y is (n − 1)-generic relative to T for S (no extension
in T of Y |m is in S). Consider an arbitrary r ∈ T such that r ⊇ Y |m. Since
r ∈ T , let q be such that Ψ(q) ⊇ r and q ⊇ p. We note q ⊇ Φ(Ψ(q)) ⊇ Φ(r) ⊇
Φ(Y |m) ⊇ X |n. Hence by the condition for this case, q /∈ Ψ−1(S) so r /∈ S.
Since r is arbitrary, for all r ⊇ Y |m with r ∈ T we have r /∈ S.
We note that a similar proof can be used to show for n ≥ 1 that sets in the
same truth table degree as an n-generic are n-generic relative to some perfect
tree.
We can now use the approach outlined above.
Theorem 2.3. For every n ∈ ω, the set of reals not n-generic relative to some
perfect tree is countable.
Proof. Fix n ∈ ω and let
B = {(x, z) | ∃c∃h[h is (n+ 1)-generic(c⊕ z) and x ≡T,z c⊕ h}
B is arithmetic (since c, h ≤T x⊕ z) so B is Borel. Given any reals C and Z, we
let H be (n+ 1)-generic(C ⊕Z) and X = H ⊕C to get X ∈ BZ with X ≥T C.
Hence BZ is cofinal in the Turing degrees. By the theorem of Reimann and
Slaman [9] noted above, for all but countably many reals Y , there exist X and
G such that Y ≡T,G X and X ∈ BG.
Given such X and Y , there exist reals A and H such that A⊕H ≡T,G X and
H is (n+1)-generic(A⊕G). Hence X ≡T,A⊕G H , so Y ≡T,A⊕G H . By Lemma
2.2, Y is n-generic relative to some perfect tree. Therefore, all but countably
many reals are n-generic relative to some perfect tree.
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3 ZFC− and Infinitely Many Iterates of the
Power Set of ω Required
If we examine the proof that the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect
tree is countable, we see that the greatest use of the axioms of ZFC comes from
the application of Borel determinacy. The proof uses determinacy of a Π0n+3
game on ωω, so it requires ZFC− and the existence of n iterates of the power
set of ω [6]. We prove that for sufficiently large n this is essentially the best
possible result. As a consequence, we show that for any finite k the statement
“For all n, the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is countable”
cannot be proved from ZFC− and k iterates of the power set of ω. This suggests
the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is a countable set of
considerable size and complexity.
Theorem 3.1. For every k ∈ ω the statement “For all n, the set of reals
not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is countable” cannot be proved from
ZFC−+“∃k iterates of the power set of ω”.
To prove this theorem we use a template developed by Reimann and Slaman
[9] for reals random relative to a continuous measure. We work with the case
k = 0; the general case follows the same pattern. Let λ be the least ordinal such
that Lλ |= ZFC
− and let O be the set of limit ordinals below λ. Let Mα, for
α ∈ O, denote master codes. These are the elementary diagrams of canonical
countings of Lα. Reimann and Slaman prove the theorem by showing that for
some fixed n, for every α ∈ O, the master code Mα is not n-random relative to
a continuous measure. Since the set of master codes is not a countable set in
Lλ, we then have Lλ does not satisfy “For all n, the set of reals not n-random
relative to any continuous measure is countable” but Lλ |= ZFC
−. Thus the
statement cannot be proved from ZFC−.
To show this, they assume towards a contradiction that some Mβ is n-
random relative to the measure µ. It is arithmetic to say that M is a master
code for an ω-model of “V = Lα and α a limit and α 6≥ λ”. Note such an
ω-model need not be well-founded. They show it is also arithmetic to require
that there exists a fixed m ∈ ω such that for all such M and N either one
coded model embeds into the other or there is a Σ0m(M ⊕N) set witnessing the
ill-foundedness of one of the coded models.
Reimann and Slaman define a setM, arithmetic in µ, of such psuedo-master
codes which are recursive in µ and not shown to be ill-founded by such a com-
parison. They then define an order on M such that the well-founded part of
this order, I, is arithmetic in µ ⊕Mβ and equals the set of M ∈ M which are
actual master codes Mα. Since random sets cannot accelerate the calculation
of well-foundedness, I is arithmetic in µ.
Let γ ≤ β be least such that Mγ 6≤T µ. Since γ < λ there is a real
X ∈ Def(Lγ) \ Lγ . By taking a Skolem hull of the parameters defining X ,
Reimann and Slaman show that Mγ is arithmetic in I, hence arithmetic in µ,
and Mγ ≤T Mβ . Since randomness cannot accelerate arithmetic definability,
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Mγ ≤T µ for a contradiction.
This proof uses only two facts about randomness. Namely, that it cannot
accelerate arithmetic definability or calculations of well-foundedness. We can
give an abstract summary as follows. Let R(G, T, n) be a ∆11 predicate and
suppose that for all numbers l there exists a number n such that for all G and T
such that R(G, T, n) and all k,m < l the following two statements hold. First,
for any real A, if A is Σ0k(T ) and Σ
0
m(G⊕T ) then A is Σ
0
m(T ). Second, if L is a
linear order and WF the well founded part of L such that L is ∆0k(T ) and WF
is ∆0k(G⊕ T ) then WF is ∆
0
k(T ). We can then conclude that for every number
k the statement “For all n, the set of reals G such that for no T does R(G, T, n)
is countable” cannot be proved from ZFC− + ∃k iterates of the power set of ω.
We note that for some choices of R the statement will not hold at all, in which
case this is trivial.
To complete a similar proof for genericity relative to the perfect tree T in
place of randomness relative to the measure µ we will demonstrate the corre-
sponding facts for genericity. We will show that for any fixed m and k, and for
n sufficiently large relative to m and k, if G is n-generic relative to the perfect
tree T , then:
1. If A is Σ0k(T ) and Σ
0
m(G⊕ T ) then A is Σ
0
m(T ).
2. If WF is the well founded part of a linear order recursive in T and
WF ≤T G⊕ T then WF ≤T T (weaker than above, but see below).
To show the first fact, we can routinely relativize to a perfect tree the proof
that for reals A,G where G is k-generic and A is Σ0k and Σ
0
m(G), we get that
A is Σ0m. The second fact suffices for our purposes since if L is ∆
0
k(T ) and G is
(n+ k − 1)-generic relative to T then G is n-generic(L) relative to T . To prove
the second fact, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let T be a perfect tree and L a linear order of ω where L ≤T T .
Let WF be the well founded part of L. Let G be 2-generic relative to T and such
that WF ≤T G⊕ T . Then WF ≤T T .
Proof. By (1.) above, it suffices to show WF is Σ02(T ). For c ∈ ω and D an
initial segment of L we use the notation c ∈ D to mean there is an ordered pair
in D which contains c. Since L ≤T T , if T can compute which numbers are in
an initial segment then T can compute the initial segment itself.
Let Φ be a T -recursive Turing reduction such that Φ(G) =WF . For b ∈ L let
P (b) be the set of reals which code initial segments of L below b. Let R(b) ≤T L
be the tree defined below such that P (b) is the set of paths through R(b).
R(b) = {σ ∈ 2<ω | ∀m,n < length(σ)[(m ∈ σ → m ≤L b) ∧
((m ∈ σ ∧ n ≤L m)→ n ∈ σ)]}
We define Q as the set of strings in T below which Φ does not split on T .
Q = {σ ∈ T | ¬∃τ, γ ∈ T [τ, γ ⊇ σ ∧ Φ(τ) ⊥ Φ(γ)]}
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Suppose for some n, G|n ∈ Q. Then we can calculate whether m ∈ WF by
looking for the first σ ∈ T such that σ ⊇ G|n and [Φ(σ)](m)↓ and taking its
value. Hence WF ≤T T and we are done. Thus we may assume for all n,
G|n /∈ Q. Since G is 2-generic relative to T , there is an l such that for all
τ ⊇ G|l with τ ∈ T we have τ /∈ Q.
We will use the fact that b ∈ WF iff WF /∈ P (b). Let S = {σ | Φ(σ) ↓
∧ Φ(σ) /∈ R(b)}. We will determine if b ∈ WF by checking for the existence of
a real which computes an element of P (b) using Φ and is generic for S (some
initial segment has no extension in S). Let Θ(b) be the statement
∃σ ∈ T [σ ⊇ G|l ∧ ∀τ ∈ T [τ ⊇ σ → Φ(τ) ∈ R(b)]]
Claim. b /∈ WF ⇔ Θ(b).
Proof. (=⇒) WF ∈ P (b) since b /∈ WF . Hence Φ(G) ∈ P (b) so G does not meet
S. Since G is 1-generic relative to T , there is a k such that for all τ ∈ T with
τ ⊇ G|k we have τ /∈ S. Thus G|k witnesses Θ(b).
(⇐=) Let σ witness Θ(b). Then for all τ ∈ T with τ ⊇ σ we have Φ(τ) ∈
R(b). Also, since σ ⊇ G|l, for all such τ we have τ /∈ Q so Φ splits on T below
τ . Using these facts we can construct a perfect subtree of R(b) by applying Φ
to T below σ. Hence P (b) is uncountable. Since there are only countably many
well founded initial segments of L, b /∈ WF .
By the claim WF is Σ02(T ) as desired. Hence WF ≤T T .
4 Iterated Hyperjumps
We now look at the set of reals which are n-generic relative to some perfect tree
for low values of n. We still find that the set of reals not n-generic relative to any
perfect tree is a large countable set. It contains reals of high complexity and its
countability cannot be proved in large fragments of second order arithmetic. We
show that the finite iterates of the hyperjump, O(n), are not 2-generic relative
to any perfect tree and the iterates O(α) are not 5-generic relative to any perfect
tree for any α below the least λ such that supβ<λ(βth admissible) = λ.
We start with an outline of the proof for the case ofO. This set can be viewed
as {e | Ue is well-founded} where Ue denotes the eth recursive tree in ω<ω. We
note O then has the property that the well-foundedness of subtrees cannot
contradict the decision made for the parent tree. This can be characterized by
a Σ02 set, S, so that if O were 2-generic relative to some T then T would be able
to calculate O by tracing subtrees.
Lemma 4.1. O is not 2-generic relative to any perfect tree.
Proof. Suppose not, witnessed by T . Recall O = {e | Ue is well-founded}. Let
h be a recursive function defined by Uh(e,γ) = {σ ∈ Ue | σ ⊆ γ ∨ σ ⊇ γ}. Let
S = {τ ∈ T | ∃n∃l[τ(n) = 0 ∧ ¬(∃γ ∈ Un)(∃θ ∈ T )[length(γ) ≥ l ∧
θ ⊇ τ ∧ θ(h(n, γ)) = 0]]}
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The set S contains finite strings τ which say some tree Un is ill-founded, but
for some length l, there is no extension of τ in T that says some subtree of Un
with root length at least l is ill-founded. In short, τ says Un is ill-founded but
there is no sequence of extensions in T to witness it.
Let Un be an arbitrary ill-founded tree (n /∈ O) and let Z be an infinite path
through Un. Then the subtrees extending initial segments of Z, Uh(n,Z|l) for
l ∈ ω, are also ill-founded. Hence O(h(n, Z|l)) = 0 for every l ∈ ω so n does
not witness that O meets S. We conclude that O does not meet S. Since S is
Σ02(T ) and we have assumed O is 2-generic relative to T , we let k be such that
for any σ ∈ T extending O|k we have σ /∈ S. We can now use the fact that
these extensions are sufficiently well behaved to calculate O from T .
Claim. For any number e, we have e ∈ O ⇐⇒ ¬∃σ ∈ T [σ ⊇ O|k ∧ σ(e) = 0].
Proof. (⇐=) Let σ = O|max(k, e) + 1. σ ∈ T since O is a path in T , so
σ(e) = O(e) = 1. Hence e ∈ O.
(=⇒) Let e ∈ O and suppose the conclusion fails, witnessed by σ. Ue is well-
founded since e ∈ O. We will construct an infinite path through Ue to get the
desired contradiction. We use an induction to simultaneously construct paths
γ through Ue and θ through T . Let j0 denote e and jm+1 denote h(jm, γm+1).
We maintain inductively that θm(jm) = 0.
We begin with γ0 = 〈〉 and θ0 = σ and note θ0(j0)) = σ(e) = 0 by our
assumption. Let γm and θm be given. θm ⊇ σ ⊇ O|k so θm /∈ S. Hence we have
∀n∀l[θm(n) 6= 0 ∨ ∃α ∈ Un∃β ∈ T [length(α) ≥ l ∧ β ⊇ θm ∧
β(h(n, α)) = 0]]
Choosing n = jm and l =length(γm)+1 and noting by our induction hypothesis
θm(jm) = 0, we get
∃α ∈ Ujm∃β ∈ T [length(α) ≥ length(γm) + 1 ∧ β ⊇ θm ∧
β(h(jm, α)) = 0]
We now let γm+1 = α and θm+1 = β. We note that γm+1 ⊇ γm since γm+1 ∈
Uh(jm−1,γm) and that θm+1(jm+1) = θm+1(h(jm, γm+1)) = 0, completing the
induction.
Thus O is Π01(T ), contradicting O being 2-generic relative to T .
The next lemma will be used in showing that O(α+1) is not n-generic relative
to any perfect tree, given that O(α) is not. We prove it by applying the same
ideas used in the above lemma to the column of O(α) which computes O.
Lemma 4.2. Let X ≥T O be 2-generic relative to the perfect tree T . Then
T ≥T O.
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Proof. Let Φ be a Turing reduction such that Φ(X) = O. We define S as before,
this time for the image under Φ.
S = {τ ∈ T | ∃n∃l[[Φ(τ)](n) = 0 ∧ ¬(∃γ ∈ Un)(∃θ ∈ T )[length(γ) ≥ l ∧
θ ⊇ τ ∧ [Φ(θ)](h(n, γ)) = 0]]}
We note S is Σ02(T ) and X does not meet S. Since X is 2-generic relative to
T , we let k be such that for any σ ∈ T extending X |k we have σ /∈ S. We
now claim that for any e, we have e ∈ O if and only if there does not exist a
σ ∈ T with σ ⊇ X |k and [Φ(σ)](e) = 0. This is proved in substantially the same
manner as the claim in the previous lemma. As a result, O is Π01(T ). We can
now use the fact that generics do not accelerate arithmetic definability. Since
X is 2-generic relative to T and O ≤T X , we get O ≤T T as desired.
Corollary 4.3. For all n ∈ ω, O(n) is not 2-generic relative to any perfect tree.
Proof. Fix n and suppose not, witnessed by T . We show by induction on m ≤ n
that O(m) ≤T T . Given O(m) ≤T T , we relativize Lemma 4.2 to O(m) to get
O(m+1) ≤T T , completing the induction. Hence O
(n) ≤T T , contradicting our
assumption that O(n) is 2-generic relative to T .
Corollary 4.4. The statement “All but countably many reals are 2-generic
relative to some perfect tree” fails to hold in Π11-CA.
Proof. Consider the standard model of Π11-CA containing the reals X such that
∃n[X ≤T O
(n)]. The set {O(n) | n ∈ ω} is not a countable set in this model.
To handle limit ordinals, we use a lemma in the style of Enderton and
Putnam [2].
Lemma 4.5 (Slaman [12]). Let A be a set and λ a recursive limit ordinal.
Suppose that for all β < λ, O(β) ≤T A. Then O(λ) is Σ05(A).
Proof. We continue to use O = {e | Ue is well founded} where Ue denotes the
eth recursive tree in ω<ω. Since O ≤T A we can define O from A by noting
that Ue is well founded iff Ue has no infinite path recursive in A. Hence O is
uniformly Π03(A). Similarly, we can get O
O is uniformly Π04(A) by X = O⊕O
O
iff
(X)0 = O ∧ (e ∈ (X)1 ↔ U
(X)0
e has no infinite path recursive in A)
where (X)0 and (X)1 denote the two columns of X .
We extend this idea to find a uniform definition for O(λ). Fix a system of
notations, o, for λ. We have
(b, k) ∈ O(λ) ⇔ ∃m[{m}A = Y ∧ k ∈ (Y )b ∧ [∀c∀d[o(c) < o(b)→
((o(c) = o(d) + 1→ Γ((Y )d, (Y )c)) ∧
(o(c) a limit ordinal → ∀n∀p[(Y )cn(p) = ((Y )c)n(p)]))]]]
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where c0, c1, c2, . . . is the fundamental sequence for o(c) and Γ(X,Z) is the
statement
∀e[e ∈ Z ↔ UXe has no infinite path recursive in A]
Then Γ is Π04(A) so O
(λ) is Σ05(A).
If we repeat the proof with O(λ) we improve the result slightly to O(λ) is
∆05(A).
Now we can complete our induction.
Theorem 4.6. Let λ be the least ordinal such that supβ<λ(βth admissible) = λ.
Then for all α < λ we have O(α) is not 5-generic relative to any perfect tree.
Proof. Suppose not, witnessed by β and T . We define the function f by f(0) =
ωCK1 , f(δ + 1) = least admissible greater than f(δ), and for limit δ, f(δ) =
supξ<δ f(ξ). We note that λ is the least fixed point of f . Using the fact that
ωO
(δ)
1 < ω
O(δ+1)
1 for any δ [10], we see by induction that f(δ) ≤ ω
O(δ)
1 for all δ.
Let α be least such that O(α) 6≤T T . Then α ≤ β < λ so α < f(α). If
α = ξ + 1 for some ξ then Lemma 4.2 relativized to O(ξ) would result in a
contradiction. Hence α is a nonzero limit ordinal so we can choose γ < α
such that α < f(γ). Then α < ωO
(γ)
1 so we can fix a system of notations,
o, for α recursive in O(γ+1). Since γ + 1 < α we have O(γ+1) ≤T T . We
now apply Lemma 4.5 relativized to O(γ+1) for T to get that O(α) ≤T T for a
contradiction.
5 1-generics
In the 1-generic case, we can use a variety of approaches to identify sets of reals
that are 1-generic relative to some perfect tree and sets whose members cannot
have this property.
A real is said to be ranked if it is a member of a countable Π01 set. Equiv-
alently, a real is ranked if it is a path through a recursive tree with no perfect
subtrees. The reader is referred to Cenzer et al. [1] for details on the topic,
including a proof that for all recursive ordinals α there is a ranked set of degree
0(α). Here we demonstrate these reals are not 1-generic relative to any perfect
tree.
Proposition 5.1. If X is 1-generic relative to some perfect tree, then X is not
ranked.
Proof. Suppose not. Let X be 1-generic relative to the perfect tree T and a path
through the recursive tree U with no perfect subtrees. Let S = {σ ∈ T | σ /∈ U}.
Then S is recursive in T and X does not meet S, so there exists an n such that
no τ ∈ T extending X |n is in S. Hence for every τ ∈ T such that τ ⊇ X |n we
have τ ∈ U . But then U has a perfect subtree, for a contradiction.
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It follows from Cenzer et al. [1] and this lemma that there are reals arbitrarily
high in the hyperarithmetic degrees which are not 1-generic relative to any
perfect tree. We note the proof of Lemma 2.2 can be relativized to start with
a perfect tree in place of 2<ω. Using this we observe that no Turing degree can
contain both a ranked set and a real 2-generic relative to some perfect tree (and
no truth table degree a ranked set and a real 1-generic relative to some perfect
tree). Hence no ∆02 set is 2-generic relative to some perfect tree, and the degrees
0(α) for any recursive α contain no reals 2-generic relative to some perfect tree.
We can also attempt to classify which reals are 1-generic relative to some
perfect tree by use of the r.e. (Ershov) and REA hierarchies. The reader is
referred to Jockusch and Shore [4] for details on these hierarchies. We begin
by observing that no real whose degree is at a finite level of the REA hierarchy
(hence also the r.e. hierarchy) is 1-generic relative to some perfect tree.
Proposition 5.2 (Slaman [11]). Let n ∈ ω, X a real of n-REA degree. Then
X is not 1-generic relative to any perfect tree.
Proof. Fix n and X and letW be an n-REA set with X ≡T W . LetW1,W2, . . .
Wn = W witness that W is n-REA; for all i ≤ n we have Wi ≤T Wi+1 and
Wi+1 is r.e.(Wi). Suppose X is 1-generic relative to T . We show by induction
that for all m ≤ n we have Wm ≤T T using the following claim:
Claim. Let Y be r.e.(T ) and Y ≤T X. Then Y ≤T T .
Proof. It suffices to show Y is r.e.(T ). Since Y ≤T X , let {e}X = Y . Let
S = {q | ∃n[{e}q(n)↓= 0 ∧ n ∈ Y ]}
We note X /∈ S and S is r.e.(T ) since Y is r.e.(T ). Hence for some l, every q
extending X |l is not in S. We can now describe Y by noting that n ∈ Y iff
∃q ⊇ X |l[{e}q(n)↓= 0]. Hence Y is r.e.(T ) as desired.
For the induction, given Wm ≤T T we note that Wm+1 is r.e.(Wm), hence
r.e.(T ), and apply the claim to Wm+1. As a result W ≤T T so X ≤T T for a
contradiction.
We might next hope to show sets of ω-REA degree are not 1-generic relative
to any perfect tree. However, we cannot even do this for sets which are ω-
r.e. In proving the Friedberg Inversion Theorem for the truth table degrees,
J. Mohrherr [8] showed by a reduction that there is a 1-generic G such that
G ≤tt 0′, hence G is ω-r.e. Here we provide a direct construction. We use the
definition [4] that X is ω-r.e. if for some partial recursive ψ : ω×ω → 2 we have
X(n) = ψ(b, n) where b is least such that ψ(b, n)↓.
Proposition 5.3. There is a 1-generic real which is ω-r.e.
Proof. In this construction we extend to meet the first r.e. set we find while
still looking for earlier r.e. sets skipped over. If we find a set that has been
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skipped, we start over again from that point. To limit the number of injuries,
we require the nth r.e. set to extend the first n bits of the current string.
We build in stages our generic X ∈ 2ω and the partial recursive witness, ψ,
that X is ω-r.e. We also use some numeric variables for bookkeeping. r denotes
the r.e. set we are looking at, ki for i ∈ ω the number of corrections at the
i-th r.e. set, and mi for i ∈ ω the length of the initial segment of X currently
meeting the i-th r.e. set (0 if not yet met). We start with ψ = ∅, X = 〈〉, r = 0,
and ki,mi = 0 for all i.
At stage n + 1 we search simultaneously for i such that mi = 0, τ ⊇
Xn|max(i,maxj<i(mj)) with length(τ) > n, and s to find {i}τs ↓. If i > r
we have found a new r.e. set and add it by letting mi =length(τ), Xn+1 = τ ,
r = i, and for l such that length(Xn) < l ≤length(Xn+1) we let ψ(2l+l−kl, l) =
Xn+1(l). If instead i < r we have found a r.e. set we have skipped over and
restart at that point. We do this by first setting mi =length(τ) and for l
such that max(i,maxj<i(mj)) < l ≤ mr setting kl to kl + 1. We next reset
Xn+1 to τ (it will not extend Xn, but will extend Xn|max(i,maxj<i(mj))).
Then, for l such that max(i,maxj<i(mj)) < l ≤ mi we extend ψ by letting
ψ(2l + l− kl, l) = Xn+1(l). Finally, for j with i < j ≤ r we set mj = 0 and last
set r = i.
Since we require the nth r.e. set to extendX |n, after stage i, the value ofX(i)
can only be changed when X is changed to meet the nth r.e. set for some n < i.
By the usual Friedberg-Muchnik counting of injuries, X(i) can be changed at
most 2i times after stage i, so at most 2i+i times in all. Hence ψ(b, n) witnesses
X is ω-r.e. by starting with b = 2i + i and moving b down one every time a
correction is made. We see that the resulting X is 1-generic since if X does not
meet the ith r.e. set then there is no extension of X |max(i,maxj<i(mj)) which
meets the ith r.e. set.
We note that by the REA Completeness Theorem (Jockusch and Shore [4])
this gives that for everyX ≥T ∅(ω) there are sets A and J such that X ≡T A⊕J
where J is 1-generic (A).
There is still considerable room left to explore in determining which reals
are 1-generic relative to some perfect tree. In particular, it is not yet known if
every real not 1-generic relative to any perfect tree is hyperarithmetic.
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